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Abstract 
We develop and test a model that extends the understanding of how people react to news of organizational 
unethical behavior and how such reactions impact stock performance. We do so by taking into account the 
interplay between the features of specific unethical acts and the features of the organizational context within 
which unethical acts occur. We propose a two-stage model in which the first stage predicts that unethical acts that 
benefit the organization are judged less harshly than are unethical acts that benefit the actor, when the 
organization is seen as pursuing a moral goal (e.g., producing inexpensive medicine rather than tobacco products). 
In such cases, the motives behind the unethical act are construed as an individual’s intentions to pursue a moral 
end. The second stage of our model connects moral judgment to action against the organization as a whole. We 
propose that moral judgments of an unethical act are more likely to translate into negative economic consequences 
for the organization when the unethical act is seen as benefiting the organization, because in such cases the 
organization is construed as an accomplice. Study 1 is an event study of stock market reactions to organizational 
unethical behavior in which the features of organizational unethical behavior were operationalized by coding 
media coverage of unethical acts. Study 2 is an experiment that used news stories to manipulate features of 
unethical behavior and measured participants’ estimates of stock performance, while incentivizing participants for 
accuracy. Both studies found support for our model. 
 
Keywords: unethical behavior, moral judgments, stock performance 
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Stock market responses to organizational unethical behavior can determine the fate of firms (King and Soule 
2007), industries (Jonsson et al. 2009), and economies (Lounsbury and Hirsch 2010). Extant models of responses 
to unethical behavior lead to general predictions that these acts will have negative implications for stock prices 
owing to anticipated negative reactions by external stakeholders (Rao and Hamilton 1996, Gunthorpe 
1997, Paruchuri and Misangyi 2015). This view ignores tremendous variance in responses to unethical acts 
occurring within organizations, because the same unethical act often results in very different reactions by the 
stock market. For example, both Whole Foods and Exxon had news stories published in which the organizations 
were overcharging customers; although Exxon experienced a three percent drop in stock price after the story, 
Whole Foods saw a one percent increase. Current models are limited in their ability to explain such differences in 
stock market responses. We argue that this is the case because they tend to conceptualize unethical behavior as 
conducted either by the organization as a whole, acting collectively as a singular agent behind the unethical act 
(e.g., Davidson et al. 1988, Gunthorpe 1997, Paruchuri and Misangyi 2015), or by individual agents acting in 
isolation from the firm context (e.g., Lerner et al. 1998, Alicke et al. 2008). 
We extend past perspectives by proposing that stock market responses to organizational unethical behavior are 
shaped by an interplay between features of individual unethical acts and features of the organizational context 
within which the acts occur. Our premise is that because investors are focused on the likelihood that publicly 
traded firms will return a positive investment, they are sensitive to the possibility that unethical acts may lead to 
negative reactions by the public; for example, in the form of consumer boycotts or legal sanctions (Gunthorpe 
1997, Palmrose et al. 2004, Lindenmeier et al. 2012). Thus, to understand how investors respond to organizational 
unethical behavior, it is important to understand how people form moral judgments of unethical acts that transpire 
within organizations, as well as whether these judgments translate, or are anticipated to translate, into actions that 
are economically damaging to the firm as a whole. 
We propose a two-stage model that focuses on attributions of a perpetrator’s motives as a determinant of moral 
judgments directed toward the individual agent(s) who perpetrated the act (stage 1) and attributions of 
organizational responsibility as a determinant of whether moral judgments of the act translate into consequences 
for the organization (stage 2). Our model is consistent with dominant ethical decision-making frameworks 
suggesting people first have to notice a moral issue, then formulate judgments about it, and these judgments in 
turn guide their reactions (Rest 1986, Jones 1991). To construct our model, we build on a distinction between 
unethical acts as either benefiting the firm (pro-organizational unethical behavior, such as overcharging customers 
to benefit the firm) or an isolated individual (or group) who committed the act (proself unethical behavior, such as 
stealing from the organization to benefit the actor) (Pinto et al. 2008, Umphress and Bingham 2011).1 This 
distinction is crucial to both stages of our model. 
In the first stage, advancing self-interest by harming others through unethical acts (proself unethical behavior) 
will generally be judged as immoral, because it represents a clear-cut violation of a community’s interests (Fehr 
and Gächter 2000). However, an unethical act that is intended to benefit the firm (pro-organizational unethical 
behavior) may represent a conflict of one goal valued by the community against another. For example, accounting 
irregularities aimed at helping a firm produce affordable medication may undermine the value of transparent 
reporting, but with the socially valued goal of improving public health. Thus, when the overarching goal of the 
organization is perceived as more moral (e.g., producing affordable medication), pro-organizational unethical acts 
may be judged as less immoral than proself unethical behavior. 
In the second stage of our model, concerning the connection between moral judgments of an individual agent(s)’ 
unethical behavior and consequences for the organization as a whole, we posit that whether the unethical act was 
proself or pro-organizational will inform whether the broader organization should be held responsible. Unethical 
behaviors committed by individual agent(s) within an organization are often ambiguous with respect to the degree 
to which the firm as a whole was involved and should be held responsible. When the unethical behavior is 
engaged in to benefit the organization, observers might suspect that the organization as a whole allowed or even 
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facilitated such actions, and moral judgments of individual agent(s)’ unethical acts are likely to translate into 
actions against the organization. However, observers are less likely to suspect that the organization was involved 
when an employee engages in proself unethical behavior that produces no benefit (or even produces harm) for the 
organization. In such cases, observers’ moral judgments of individual agent(s)’ unethical acts are less likely to 
translate into negative consequences for the firm. 
Thus, our model takes into account the interplay between the unethical act and the organizational context and 
reveals the crucial roles of intended beneficiary of the unethical act and the morality of the organizational goal in 
explaining stock market responses to unethical organizational behaviors. Figure 1 summarizes our theoretical 
model, which we tested and found support for across two studies. Study 1 is an event study of stock market 
reactions to organizational unethical acts. Study 2 is an experiment in which we used news stories to manipulate 
features of unethical behavior and measured people’s estimates of stock price performance, while incentivizing 
participants for accuracy. Study materials, data, analysis code, online appendices, and other materials are 
available at https://osf.io/ke7ts/?view_only=13960157997041c2a04926b0a94ac791  
Figure 1. Theoretical Model 
 
This paper makes several theoretical contributions. Most extant models of responses to organizational unethical 
behavior conceptualize such acts as committed within a black box of the firm (Greve et al. 2010). We show the 
importance of opening this box and simultaneously considering the features of the act itself as well as the features 
of the organizational context, to understand responses relevant to the entire firm. For instance, although past 
theories suggest that unethical behavior results in moral reprimand (Greve et al. 2010), we show that unethical 
behaviors committed within organizations may not result in negative responses (in the form of harsh moral 
judgment) in the cases of pro-organizational unethical behavior occurring in firms seen as pursuing a moral goal. 
Most past models of responses to unethical acts that occur within a firm also assume that negative reactions lead 
to negative responses for the entire organization (Strachan et al. 1983, Karpoff et al. 1999). We show that 
depending on the features of the unethical act, this might not be the case, most notably in situations in which the 
act was meant to benefit the actor and not the firm. 
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We also extend recent work that has emphasized the importance of looking at the distinction between personal 
and social motives of similar unethical acts (Gino and Pierce 2009, Umphress et al. 2010, Wiltermuth 
2011, Wiltermuth et al. 2013). Though this work has been important in clarifying the motivational differences 
arising as a function of different possible beneficiaries of unethical behavior, it was primarily intended to explain 
the reasons why people engage in other-benefiting unethical acts. Thus, it says little about how external 
stakeholders and the public react to unethical behaviors committed to benefit others versus the self, a question 
that our studies begin to answer. 
Another contribution of our research is to prior work on factors that buffer an organization from negative 
economic consequences following unethical acts becoming public knowledge. Prior work in the area of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) has shown that prosocial programs, such as sponsoring volunteer initiatives, produce a 
type of moral capital for a firm that provides shareholders with “insurance-like” protection in the event of 
unethical organizational acts (Peloza 2006; Godfrey et al. 2009; Flammer 2013, 2015). We contribute to this work 
by identifying another organizational feature that in some cases produces “buffering effects,” irrespective of any 
CSR programs. Our model suggests that the morality of an organization’s goals also affords insurance-like 
protections when the unethical act benefits the organization, because in such cases moral judgments of the act and 
the resulting negative consequences for stock performance are tempered. 
First Stage: Attribution of Motives and Moral Judgment of the Unethical Act 
Moral rules serve to enable social life by ensuring that people do not harm others (Fehr and Gächter 2000, Haidt 
and Kesebir 2010). Not all moral rules aim to optimize the immediate good of the community, but generally, 
impressions of morality do depend strongly on the extent to which an action increases or decreases the well-being 
of larger social units (Mill 1897, Brady 1985). For example, Fritzsche and Becker (1984) presented a series of 
ethical dilemmas to a sample of marketing managers, and they found that the majority provided a rationale for 
their decisions by discussing consequences for the social welfare (e.g., “no significant harm to environment,” 
“risk of injury or death is low,” etc.). Similarly, in the well-known “trolley problem,” in which participants are 
asked to decide whether to flip a switch to redirect a trolley, thereby killing one person to save five, most people 
(90%) optimize the welfare of the community by flipping the switch (Hauser 2006). 
Given the importance of community well-being in the perception of the morality of given acts, committing 
unethical behavior to satisfy one’s own self-interest by harming others will generally be judged as immoral, 
because such behavior threatens the well-being of the community to benefit an individual (Fehr and Gächter 
2000). However, organizational unethical behaviors can also be undertaken not to benefit the self but to benefit a 
firm, and we argue that when the firm is pursuing a moral goal, moral judgments of pro-organizational unethical 
acts will be tempered. Whereas some firms are focused exclusively on generating profit, and might not be 
perceived as pursuing a socially valued mission, others pursue a profit-maximizing and a prosocial mission 
simultaneously (Margolis and Walsh 2003). An example is a firm that produces inexpensive anticancer 
medication or a firm that pursues a triple bottom-line accounting framework. An example of a firm with a less 
moral goal would be a company that pursues profits while generating negative social externalities (e.g., tobacco 
companies such as Philip Morris and British American).2 Given the importance of social impact in moral 
judgments, we propose that unethical behavior that benefits a firm pursuing a moral goal will be judged as less 
immoral than the same act occurring within a firm with less-moral goals. 
When a perpetrator commits unethical behavior to benefit a firm that is (also) serving a moral goal, the unethical 
behavior will be construed as an act that (also) helps the organization serve a socially valued goal and create 
social benefits, which should ultimately temper moral judgments of the act committed by the perpetrator. For 
example, if a company produces healthy and chemical-free food at competitive prices, and an employee engages 
in accounting irregularities, this sacrifices the value of transparency of reporting but can be perceived as 
promoting a socially valued goal. For that reason, within organizations perceived as (also) serving a moral goal, 
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the public may judge pro-organizational unethical acts as less immoral than proself unethical acts. For firms seen 
as serving less-moral goals, the premium for an actor acting for the sake of the organization should be smaller, 
because the act is less likely to be construed as indirectly aiding a socially valued goal. Formally, 
Hypothesis 1 
Pro-organizational (versus proself) unethical behavior leads to more lenient moral judgments of the actor(s) the 
more the organization’s goals are perceived as moral. 
Second Stage: Moral Judgments of the Act and Stock Market Reactions 
Society is interested in responding to unethical acts by inflicting negative consequences on those responsible, 
because doing so maintains the social order (Fehr and Gächter 2000). For example, in the case of organizational 
unethical acts, negative public responses can take the form of legal sanctions (Simpson 2002), consumer boycotts 
(Miller and Sturdivant 1977), and lower willingness to invest in the firm (Frooman 1997), all of which should be 
reflected in a stock price decrease. As unethical acts performed by organizational agents are judged to be more 
immoral by the public (and investors anticipate the public to judge them as more immoral), stock performance 
should worsen. 
At the same time, we argue that whether moral judgments of an unethical act translate into negative responses 
toward the entire organization (rather than the perpetrator) depends on the perceived beneficiary of the act, 
because the beneficiary serves as a strong cue for responsibility attributions. We specifically focus on 
responsibility attributions for the second stage of our model, which connects judgment to action, because there is 
much support from the moral and psychological literature regarding the centrality of such attributions in ultimate 
behavioral responses. For example, when discussing the notion of just desserts reactions, Darley (2009) concludes 
that it is moral culpability rather than harm that is mainly driving punishment judgments (Alter et al. 2007). 
Neural imaging research (Young and Saxe 2009) also demonstrates the primacy of activation of brain areas that 
relate to theory of mind information (i.e., information that would help in understanding blameworthiness when 
deciding about punishment for moral wrongdoing). 
Yet organizational unethical acts are often ambiguous with respect to how much the firm as a whole was involved 
and should be held responsible. The central tension in agency theory illustrates this point: principals have an 
interest in monitoring agents within the firm, but in many cases agents act on their own, even against a principal’s 
best interests (Eisenhardt 1989). For this reason we argue that external stakeholders would attend to situational 
cues surrounding unethical behaviors to make sense of the extent to which the firm was involved. Following a 
similar logic, past work has focused on the extent to which an employee is in an obedient role as a situational 
factor explaining when third-party observers assign responsibility for unethical behavior to the actor rather than 
the organization (Hamilton 1986, Hamilton and Sanders 1995). If an individual is in an obedient position in the 
firm, it is less likely that third-party observers will believe that a broader organizational system was not involved 
in an unethical act (Gailey and Lee 2005). This work suggests that although across a range of cases observers 
might attribute responsibility for acts committed by individual employees to the firm, such attributions will be 
stronger in some cases (e.g., when the employee is in an obedient position). In a similar vein, we argue that the 
perceived beneficiary of an unethical act serves as an important cue determining whether moral judgments of the 
actor translate into negative stock performance. 
Pinto et al. (2008) highlight the beneficiary of an unethical act as a key feature distinguishing when an act is seen 
as systemic to the firm (a “corrupt organization”) or simply carried out by an isolated member or group (an 
“organization of corrupt individuals”). Pinto et al. (2008) distinguish between an “organization of corrupt 
individuals, in which a significant proportion of an organization’s members act in a corrupt manner primarily for 
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their personal benefit, and a corrupt organization, in which a group collectively acts in a corrupt manner for the 
benefit of the organization” (p. 688; emphasis added). Because there is no reason why a firm would entice 
unethical behavior that produces no benefit (or even produces harm) for the firm, external stakeholders should be 
less likely to suspect that the organization more broadly was involved when an employee engages in proself rather 
than pro-organizational unethical behavior. For example, observers are arguably more likely to perceive the firm 
as “guilty” of creative accounting that helped its profits than employee theft that harmed its profits. This is not to 
say, though, that external stakeholders, or investors, will not react negatively to proself unethical behavior (i.e., 
attributing that the firm cannot monitor employees), but to a lesser extent. According to this logic, moral 
judgments of unethical acts are more likely to translate into negative stock market responses when the firm (rather 
than an isolated individual) benefited from the act. Formally, 
Hypothesis 2 
The relationship between moral judgments and stock market response will be more negative the more pro-
organizational the unethical behavior is perceived to be. 
Overall Model Summary and Areas of Empirical Ambiguity 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 form a moderated mediation model (Figure 1), which leads to interesting implications for 
organizations within which unethical events occur. When the firm has less-moral goals, in the first stage, pro-
organizational unethical acts should be judged similarly negatively as proself unethical acts (because neither will 
be seen as promoting an ultimate moral goal of the organization). In the second stage, these moral judgments 
should more strongly negatively impact stock market performance when the act is more pro-organizational, 
because in this case the organization is more likely to be construed as an accomplice. In firms with more-moral 
goals, proself unethical behavior should in both stages elicit similar reactions as in firms with less-moral goals, 
because the goal of the firm does not matter for how the unethical behavior is perceived. However, pro-
organizational unethical behavior occurring in firms with moral goals presents an interesting and important 
empirical puzzle. In such cases, in the first stage, the unethical act committed by individual agent(s) will be 
judged less harshly because it will be construed as aiding a moral goal of the organization. However, in the 
second stage, if observers do form negative moral judgments of the unethical act, these moral judgments will 
translate into negative consequences for the firm, given that the firm is likely to be construed as an accomplice. 
As such, it is unclear a priori how the two stages combine and thus what the total effect of pro-organizational 
unethical behavior committed within organizations with a more moral goal will be. As the perceived level of 
morality of the organizational goal increases, observers might judge the unethical behaviors less harshly until a 
point at which such behavior is no longer encoded as immoral, effectively severing the link between unethical 
behavior and ultimate stock market performance. 
Study 1: Event Study 
Study 1 is an event study of stock market reactions to organizational unethical behaviors. Our dependent variable 
was event-level cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of stocks within firms in which unethical behaviors occurred. 
To operationalize perceptions of morality of the organizational goal, and the beneficiary of the unethical act, we 
would ideally collect direct (self-reported) information on investors’ perceptions of these characteristics of the 
unethical act and the firm. Given that such data would be nearly impossible to collect, we instead located 
newspaper articles describing organizational unethical behaviors, because this would be investors’ main source of 
information concerning organizational unethical acts (Gunthorpe 1997). To approximate how an average investor 
would interpret the unethical act and how they perceive the firm in terms of the morality of its goals, we had 
trained research assistants (RAs) code each article for perceptions of these constructs. To validate our 
operationalization approach, we conducted semistructured interviews with three institutional investors and two 
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traders working in different U.S. banks. One investor captured a sentiment shared by everyone we interviewed 
when he said, 
No one really knows, fully, why stock prices vary in the way they do. And I don’t really care if price gouging is 
morally right or wrong, but the public might, and it’s more about what news of that actually does to the earning 
power of the firm. Market prices react very quickly, and we are trying to anticipate how the public might respond 
and how that will impact earning power. 
Information gathered from these interviews suggested that it was appropriate to operationalize perceptions of 
morality of the organizational goal and the beneficiary of the unethical act by measuring the relevant constructs 
from the perspective of the public. 
Event Sampling 
Because the perceived morality of an organization’s goals may change over time (i.e., the morality of Enron’s 
goals before 2001 may be viewed differently after the 2001 scandal), we focused on events from 2014 and 2015 
(these were the most recent years with complete CAR data at the time our research). Additionally, focusing on a 
specific time period reduced the number of economy- and industry-wide changes that may impact CAR. To select 
cases, we used a comprehensive sampling strategy that minimized the risk of selection bias. First, RAs searched 
through every article published in 2014 and 2015 in the New York Times (NYT; n = 71,063) and Wall Street 
Journal (WSJ; n = 201,429), which are the most influential newspapers dealing with business issues (Gunthorpe 
1997). RAs were instructed to flag any articles that seemed to reflect “organizational actions that are deemed 
immoral or unacceptable according to societal norms or general standards of conduct” (Pfarrer et al. 2008, p. 
731). RAs were instructed to take a liberal approach and include any story that seemed even tangentially relevant. 
We also reviewed every U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission press release and all red-flagged events in the 
Capital IQ Key Events database to verify that the NYT or WSJ covered all the relevant events. 
Once all relevant articles were compiled, we conducted several steps to determine whether they should be 
included in our sample. First, one assumption of the event study methodology and our theory is that an event 
provides new information to the market. Thus, we focused on news stories that reported on organizational 
unethical behaviors for the first time. We checked whether the story was the first time the event was reported on 
by searching through all of ProQuest and Factiva and conducting extensive general internet searches. Second, 
another assumption of the event study methodology is that the researcher has isolated the effect of a focal event 
from the effects of other events. Thus, once we located the first date that the news story was reported on, we 
searched for confounding stories occurring within the focal firm during the event window. For example, we made 
sure that no news stories about mergers and acquisition, chief executive officer retirement, etc., occurred the day 
before or the day after the news story. If there were confounding events, the story was not included. On the basis 
of those criteria, our sample consisted of 158 independent events, covering 96 S&P 1500 firms, and 37 industries. 
Independent Variables: Article Coding 
Coders 
Our article coding process involved two attempts. First, to code the articles from 2014, we recruited two senior 
finance majors from a large university on the East Coast of the United States. The coders, who were unaware of 
our predictions, were presented with the coding scheme and instructed to review each article from the perspective 
of an investor and anticipate how external stakeholders would react to the story. The logic was that investors may 
be personally agnostic regarding the morality of an unethical act, but they likely anticipate how the public will 
react. Coders evaluated the first 24 articles together, to confirm agreement, and then coded articles separately. 
Later, to increase our sample size, we added a second year (i.e., 2015). For this coding, we recruited two 
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psychology students (one undergraduate and one graduate), and they both coded all articles for 2015. Coders 
exhibited sufficient levels of interrater reliability, which ranged from moderate to strong (ICC1 ranged from 0.22 
to 0.90, ICC2 from 0.36 to 0.95; F113, 227 = 1.57 to 18.68, all p’s < 0.05; see Table 10 in the online appendix for full 
results), justifying aggregation to the event level. All the analyses reported below led to the same conclusion when 
we use data from either year separately or both years combined, and hold with or without controlling for data 
collection period. 
Measures 
All items were measured on a seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”; 7 = “strongly agree”). 
Pro-organizational Unethical Behavior 
We operationalized the beneficiary of the unethical behavior (i.e., an organization versus an individual) by asking 
the coders to rate whether the act described in the story was intended to benefit (1) an isolated individual or 
individuals personally, (2) the individual who engaged in the unethical act, (3) the focal organization as a whole, 
and (4) the company where the event occurred. The first two items represent the proself unethical behavior 
measure, and the last two items represent the pro-organizational unethical behavior measure. Although it is 
possible that some unethical acts benefit both the firm and the actor, the two measures were strongly inversely 
correlated (r = −0.80), suggesting that people tended to classify a given unethical act as either benefiting the actor 
or the firm. In addition, a confirmatory factor analysis of the four items revealed that a one-factor model fit the 
data significantly better than a two-factor model (Δχ21, 157 = 192.88, p < 0.001). We thus reverse-coded the first 
measure and averaged the two measures. Lower scores indicate that the unethical act was perceived as more 
proself and higher scores as more pro-organizational. 
Morality of the Organization’s Goals 
We operationalized the morality of organizational goals by asking the coders to code how strongly they agreed or 
disagreed that (1) the goal of the focal organization is a moral one, (2) the work that the focal organization does 
has a positive social impact, and (3) the work that the focal organization does impacts people’s lives in a positive 
way. 
Moral Judgments of the Unethical Behavior 
We operationalized moral judgments of the act by asking the RAs to code how strongly they agreed or disagreed 
that the act was (1) wrong, (2) immoral, and (3) unethical. Higher values indicate an act being evaluated as more 
immoral. 
Event-Related Stock Market Reactions 
We used Eventus to estimate abnormal returns following each of the 158 events using the market-adjusted model 
based on an equally weighted index. Consistent with prior work, we used a window of −254 to −21 days before 
the event as the baseline period that an “abnormal return” is compared against (Palmrose et al. 2004). Following 
methodological recommendations for event studies (MacKinlay 1997, McWilliams and Siegel 1997), we used the 
time window of three (−1, 0, +1) trading days, where 0 is the date of the published story, −1 is the day before the 
story, and +1 is the day after. Previous research has shown that a three-day window is appropriate for measuring 
unexpected events, such as news about unethical acts, because it allows for information leakage as well as 
potentially slower responses (Zhang and Wiersema 2009). To evaluate the appropriateness of the −1,+1 window, 
we examined Patell z values. As shown in Table 1 in the online appendix, Patell zvalues were only significant for 
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this window, and not alternative simulated windows, which suggests a −1,+1 window is where observed returns 
differed significantly. 
Controls 
We controlled for firm reputation with measures of market capitalization and firm sales (Godfrey et al. 2009) and 
whether the firm was listed on the Fortune 100 Best Companies list (Griffin and Mahon 1997) in the focal year (0 
= No, 1 = Yes). Coders also coded for perceived familiarity (two items: “I was familiar with the focal 
organization prior to reading this story,” and, “I had heard of the focal organization prior to reading the story”) 
and reputation (two items: “The focal organization has a very good reputation,” and, “The focal organization is 
respected by the general public”) of the focal firm. To examine whether effects persisted after controlling for CSR 
activity, we controlled for a proxy of CSR by compiling data from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) 
index, a source of data on companies’ social responsibility (Griffin and Mahon 1997); we separately summed the 
total number of listed strengths and concerns, which included performance in such categories as employee 
relations, diversity, human rights, and products. To account for the role of firm performance, which may have an 
effect on investors’ valuations (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003), we extracted information on return on assets (ROA) 
and earnings before interest, depreciation, taxes, and amortization (EBIDTA). Because signals of distress can 
impact stock valuation, we also controlled for expected growth, measured by market-to-book value (MTBV) 
(Fama and French 1992). 
It is possible that proself and pro-organizational unethical behaviors could systematically differ in terms of (1) the 
magnitude of the act (e.g., with proself acts being smaller in magnitude, such as employee theft, and pro-
organizational acts being larger, such as embezzling) and (2) expected legal sanctions (e.g., proself acts, such as 
employee theft, may be less likely to trigger legal fines). Thus, we controlled for both the magnitude of the act, 
using two items from the McMahon and Harvey (2006) scale of perceived moral intensity, and the likelihood that 
an event would trigger a fine or legal action by having coders code for both constructs.3 At the same time, 
although these controls address the possibility that different unethical acts might not be comparable along 
important dimensions (an effect that we do not empirically find; see online appendix), it is possible that these 
constructs partially control for the very process we theorize about. Thus, we note that our results hold with and 
without controls, and they also hold with all controls but magnitude and likelihood of a fine. 
Analytical Approach 
Though all of our events were independent (i.e., we only coded the first newspaper story of an event), several 
organizations were in our sample of events more than once. For example, Wal-Mart was in our sample six times 
for six separate events. To account for possible nonindependence among cases occurring in the same firm, in all 
analyses we used cluster-robust standard errors with events clustered within firms (Wooldridge 2003). For all 
analyses, we standardized all measures (to ease interpretation of the interactions). We used the following 
regression equations to test our hypotheses: 
 
For Equation 1, moral judgmentij is the predicted mean of moral judgment (for firm i and focal event j), β1X is 
pro-organizational unethical behavior, β2Z is perceived morality of the organization’s goals, and β3XZ is the first-
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stage interaction. Equation 1 tests the first-stage moderator hypothesis. For Equation 2, CARij is the cumulative 
abnormal return (for firm i for the two days surrounding the focal event j), β11X is moral judgment of the act, 
β12M is pro-organizational unethical behavior, and β13MX is the second-stage interaction. Equation 2 tests the 
second-stage moderator hypothesis. Once Equation 3 is decomposed, the simple slopes can be computed at four 
levels: Low Z (low morality of goals), High Z (high morality of goals), Low X (low pro-organizational unethical 
acts), and High X (high pro-organizational unethical acts). In study 2, CAR is replaced with estimated stock 
performance. 
Results 
Table 1 provides study 1 variable summaries, reliabilities, and correlations. Table 2 reports the results of the 
hypotheses tests. 
Table 1. Study 1: Variable Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Correlations (N = 158) 
 
 
Moral Judgments of Unethical Behaviors 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that pro-organizational unethical behaviors are judged less harshly within organizations that 
are perceived as having a more-moral goal. As displayed in Table 2, Model 3a, the interaction between pro-
organizational unethical behavior and perceived morality of the organizational goal was significant (b = 
−0.11, p = 0.04). See Figure 2 for a visual depiction of the interaction. When the morality of the organization’s 
goals was rated at one standard deviation above the mean, the more the unethical act was seen as pro-
organizational the less harshly it was judged (b= −0.42, p < 0.001). As the morality of the organization’s goals 
decreased, the effect weakened, and at one standard deviation below the mean it was markedly weaker (b = 
−0.21, p < 0.001), reaching nonsignificance at the lowest point of the morality of the organization’s goals (b = 
−0.11, p = 0.08). These results support Hypothesis 1. 
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Table 2. Study 1: Regression Analyses of Moral Judgments and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Figure 2. Moderating Effect of Organizational Goals on Moral Judgments (Study 1) 
 
Note. Bands are 95% confidence intervals; higher values on the y-axis indicate an unethical act being judged as 
more immoral (standardized); the x-axis shows the entire range of the standardized variable of the extent to which 
the unethical act is judged as pro-organizational (−2.42, 1.01); moderator set at ±1 standard deviation. 
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Stock Performance 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that there will be more negative stock market reactions in response to harsher moral 
judgments of the act when the unethical behavior was perceived as benefiting the organization versus the actor. 
As displayed in Table 2, Model 3b, the interaction between moral judgments and pro-organizational unethical 
behavior was significant (b = −0.30, p = 0.02). See Figure 3 for a visual depiction of the interaction. When 
unethical acts were rated at one standard deviation above the mean in terms of benefiting the firm versus an 
individual, moral judgments of the act related strongly and negatively to CAR (b = −0.38, p < 0.001). As the 
perceived beneficiary became more proself, the effect weakened, and at one standard deviation below the mean it 
was nonsignificant (b = 0.22, p = 0.30). These results support Hypothesis 2. 
Figure 3. Moderating Effect of Pro-Organizational Unethical Behavior on CAR (Study 1) 
 
Note. Bands are 95% confidence intervals; x-axis shows the entire range of the standardized variable of the extent 
to which the unethical act is judged as immoral (−3.09, 1.29); moderator set at ±1 standard deviation. 
Moderated Mediation Test 
Our full model implies that pro-organizational unethical behavior will have an indirect effect on stock prices, 
mediated through moral judgments of the act, and the effect will be stronger in the first stage when the morality of 
the organizational goal is high and in the second stage when the unethical behavior is pro-organizational. We 
tested this model by computing bias-corrected confidence intervals (CIs) (with 5,000 bootstraps) of the product of 
the two paths. The models for each stage were estimated in the same way as those reported for Hypotheses 
1 and 2, and structural equation modeling was used to combine the two paths. Per methodologic recommendations 
for structural equation modeling (Kline 2011, p. 23), in mediation tests based on structural equation modeling we 
report unstandardized estimates with their confidence intervals, corresponding standard errors, and standardized 
estimates. Perception that the unethical behavior was more pro-organizational relative to more proself had a 
significant indirect effect, mediated through moral judgments, but only when the organization’s goal was seen as 
more moral (first-stage moderation) and only at high (b = 0.23, SE = 0.10, CI [0.09, 0.47], B = 0.16) but not low 
(b = 0.00, SE = 0.10, CI [−0.20, 0.13], B = 0.12) levels of the unethical behavior being seen as pro-organizational 
(second-stage moderation). Perception that the unethical act was more pro-organizational relative to more proself 
had no indirect effect when the organization goal was seen as less moral (first-stage moderation), whether at high 
(b = −0.13, SE = 0.15, CI [−0.51, 0.07], B = −0.09) or low (b = 0.00, SE = 0.06, CI [−0.07, 0.22], B = −0.07) 
levels of the unethical behavior being seen as pro-organizational (second-stage moderation). Thus, pro-
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organizational unethical behavior has a positive effect on CAR compared with proself unethical behavior through 
moral judgments, but only when occurring within a firm with more (but not less) moral goals, and only at 
sufficiently high (but not low) levels of the unethical behavior being seen as pro-organizational. For example, on 
August 20, 2014, the New York Times printed an article about how Berkshire Hathaway (an organization that was 
rated as having high moral goals) was being investigated for antitrust activities (an act that was rated as high on 
pro-organizational unethical behavior). However, Berkshire Hathaway saw a positive CAR of 0.39% after the 
story. 
Robustness Checks 
We conducted several robustness checks to assess the strength of our findings. We reran all the analyses both with 
and without controls, and we found the same pattern of direction and significance of the effects irrespective of the 
inclusion of controls (Table 9 in the online appendix). Second, to account for possible nonindependence among 
data coming from firms as well as different industry sectors, we tested the hypotheses using a three-level model 
with cases nested within firms and industry, and this analysis led to substantively the same results (Tables 6 and 7 
in the online appendix). Third, following advice by MacKinlay 1997, we simulated counterfactual results using 
different event dates. We created 10 new CAR measures using randomly generated dates and then reran these 10 
models. All of the interaction terms testing our hypotheses for these alternative models (i.e., models predicting 
abnormal returns on random dates) were nonsignificant, with p values ranging from 0.12 to 0.98. Thus, our model 
predicts CAR following unethical organizational behaviors, but not on random dates, suggesting that the pattern 
of results is specific to unethical acts rather than reflecting unrelated stock price fluctuations (Tables 2, 3a, and 3b 
in the online appendix). The “Exploratory analysis” section of the online appendix elaborates on different 
specifications of our model and discusses main effect findings not explicitly explored through our hypotheses. 
Study 1 Discussion 
In terms of substantive importance of the effects observed in study 1, as shown in Table 2 Models 2a and 3a, the 
main effects of pro-organizational unethical behavior and the morality of the organization’s goals, and the 
interaction term for these constructs, accounted for 10% of variance in moral judgments (ΔR2 = 0.10, p < 0.05). 
This is comparable to other studies that have looked at moral judgments as an outcome (cf. R2 = 0.10, p < 0.05 
in Derfler-Rozin et al. 2018, study 1; partial η2 = 0.13, p < 0.05 in Leach et al. 2007, study 2). As shown in Table 
2 (Models 2a and 3a), the main effects of moral judgments and pro-organizational unethical behavior, and the 
interaction between these constructs, accounted for 7% of variance in CAR (ΔR2 = 0.07, p < 0.05), which is 
comparable to other studies that have examined CAR following news of unethical behavior (cf. ΔR2 = 0.04, p < 
0.05 in Godfrey et al. 2009). 
Study 2: Experiment 
In study 2 we sought to strengthen the internal validity of our conclusions through an experiment. One important 
assumption of study 1 was that investors anticipate how the public is going to react, which we assume drives 
changes in stock performance. Study 2 allowed us to capture reactions by the public in a more representative 
manner because we recruited a sample that is demographically similar to the general population, and we measured 
their moral judgments and their estimation of stock price changes following a news story of unethical behavior. 
Anticipated reaction is a good proxy for actual reactions because stock valuations fluctuate on the basis of 
anticipated reactions by external stakeholders and the general public (Higgins and Reimers 1995). We wanted to 
ensure that the scenarios had experimental realism and that participants had “skin in the game,” so participants 
were given an opportunity to earn money on the basis of the accuracy of their stock price performance estimates. 
If the stock decreased by 3% and they estimated a 3% decrease, they were 100% accurate and received the 
maximum bonus. However, if they estimated a 2% decrease, they were only partially correct and were 
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compensated depending on the extent to which they were accurate. This operationalization mirrors what happens 
in reality, because investors are rewarded for accurate predictions in stock performance. Finally, study 2 also 
operationalized the dependent variable in a similar way as in study 1. In study 1 we looked at CAR, which is the 
difference between the expected return and the actual return of a stock, and in study 2 we calculated the difference 
between how the stock was expected to perform and how it actually performed.4 
Method 
Participants 
We used Amazon’s MTurk to recruit individuals who are demographically similar to the general population 
(Buhrmester et al. 2011). We recruited 230 participants: 64.5% were male, the average age was 34.5 years (SD = 
10.75 years), and 72% were white. All participants were from the United States. The sample size was determined 
in advance, and there were no exclusions of cases. 
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to each of the four conditions of a 2 (unethical behavior beneficiary: proself 
versus pro-organization) × 2 (morality of the organization’s goal: low versus high) within-subject design. 
Participants read actual newspaper stories reporting on organizational unethical behavior and then responded to 
the measures. 
Manipulation 
We selected real newspaper articles that were as symmetric as possible across the different conditions. For 
example, in both proself conditions, participants read about employee theft. In both pro-organizational conditions, 
participants read about the focal firm overcharging customers. In both low-morality conditions, participants read 
about an oil company (Exxon). In both high-morality conditions, participants read about a supermarket featuring 
organic foods (Whole Foods). The actual name of the focal firm was scrubbed from the article and replaced with a 
short firm biography (taken from Capital IQ). The logic for this was to isolate the effect of the goals of the firm 
and reduce noise as a result of personal beliefs that individuals might have about the specific firms. 
Measures 
All items were measured on a seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”; 7 = “strongly agree”). 
Pro-organizational Unethical Behavior (Manipulation Check) 
Participants were asked to rate how strongly they agreed or disagreed that the act described was intended to 
benefit (1) an isolated individual or individuals personally, (2) the individual who engaged in the unethical act, (3) 
the focal organization as a whole, and (4) the company where the event occurred. The first two items represent the 
proself unethical behavior measure, whereas the last two items represent the pro-organizational unethical behavior 
measure. As in study 1, the measures were inversely correlated, r = −0.84, p < 0.001, and a one-factor model fit 
the data better than a two-factor model (Δχ21, 919 = 478.22, p < 0.001). We thus reverse-coded the first measure and 
averaged the two measures. 
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Perceived Morality of the Organization’s Goals (Manipulation Check) 
Participants were asked to rate how strongly they agreed or disagreed that (1) the goal of the focal organization is 
a moral one, (2) the work that the focal organization does has a positive social impact, and (3) the work that the 
focal organization does impacts people’s lives in a positive way. 
Moral Judgments of the Unethical Behavior 
Participants were asked to rate how strongly they agreed or disagreed that the act was (1) wrong, (2) immoral, and 
(3) unethical. 
Estimating Stock Performance 
We asked participants to anticipate what they thought the closing value of the stock for the focal firm would be 
the day after the newspaper story was published. We asked them to predict the percentage gain or loss in the value 
of the stock compared with the expected value had the news story never been published (i.e., if they thought the 
stock would decrease 5% the day after the story was published, compared with the expected value, they would 
select “−5%”). To make sure our measure was consistent with the CAR measure, we provided participants with 
the actual expected return for the focal company the day after each story was published, asking them to anticipate 
the relative return, that is, the extent to which the return would deviate (positively or negatively) in response to the 
event, relative to the return that would be expected if the event did not occur. The measure ranged from −10% to 
+10%. 
Analytical Approach 
Because this was a within-person study, we used within-individuals cluster-robust standard errors (Wooldridge 
2003). We used the continuous measures for perceived pro-organizational unethical behavior and morality of the 
organization’s goals. We find an equivalent pattern of results when we estimate the model using the binary 
measures representing the experimental conditions. We report the full results of the analysis using the binary 
measures in Table 11 in the online appendix. We used continuous measures in the main analyses because we 
wanted to allow people’s perceptions of the constructs to vary as they do in reality, continuously, making this 
operational definition aligned with our conceptual focus. This approach also allowed us to test the process in a 
way that mirrors study 1 and interpret the moderated mediation model in a meaningful manner. 
Results 
Table 3 provides study 2 variable summaries, reliabilities, and correlations. 
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Table 3. Study 2: Variable Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Correlations (N = 920) 
 
Stimuli Assessment 
To check that the stimuli (i.e., newspaper stories) elicited the expected perceptions in the appropriate category, we 
conducted a 2 (unethical behavior beneficiary) × 2 (morality of the organizational goals) multivariate regression. 
Stories in the pro-organizational condition were perceived as benefiting the organization more (M = 5.79, SD = 
1.19) than stories in the proself condition (M = 1.69, SD = 1.01), b = 0.19, p < 0.001. Additionally, stories in the 
low-morality condition were perceived as having organizations with less-moral goals (M = 2.66, SD = 1.40) than 
stories with organizations in the high-morality condition (M = 5.18, SD = 1.46), b = 0.17, p < 0.001. In addition, 
there was no contamination between the two factors (p’s for all interactions > 0.05). Thus, the manipulations were 
effective and orthogonal to each other. 
Moral Judgments of Unethical Behaviors 
As displayed in Table 4, Model 2a, the interaction between pro-organizational unethical behavior and perceived 
morality was significant (b = −0.11, p < 0.001). Figure 4 depicts the interaction. When the morality of the 
organization’s goals was rated at one standard deviation above the mean, pro-organizational unethical behavior 
was judged less harshly than proself unethical behavior (b = −0.21, p < 0.001). As the morality of the 
organization’s goals decreased, the effect reduced, and at one standard deviation below the mean it was 
nonsignificant (b = 0.02, p = 0.66). These results support Hypothesis 1. 
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Table 4. Study 2: Regression Analyses of Moral Judgments and Anticipated Stock Performance (Continuous 
Measures) 
 
Figure 4. Moderating Effect of Organizational Goals on Moral Judgments (Study 2) 
 
Notes. Bands are 95% confidence intervals. Higher values on the y-axis indicate an unethical act being judged as 
more immoral (standardized); the x-axis shows the entire range of the standardized variable of the extent to which 
the unethical act is judged as pro-organizational (−1.18, 1.40); moderator set at ±1 standard deviation. 
Stock Price Estimation 
As displayed in Table 4, Model 2b, the interaction between judgments of the unethical behavior and unethical 
behavior beneficiary was significant (b = −0.07, p = 0.03). See Figure 5 for a visual depiction of the interaction. 
When unethical behaviors were rated at one standard deviation above the mean in terms of benefiting the 
organization rather than the individual, judgments of the unethical act related more strongly and negatively to 
estimated stock performance (b = −0.23, p < 0.001). As the perceived beneficiary became more proself, the effect 
reduced; at one standard deviation below the mean it was markedly weakened (b = −0.09, p = 0.04), reaching 
nonsignificance at the lowest point on the scale of the extent to which the unethical act was perceived to be pro-
organizational rather than proself (b = −0.17, p = 0.11). These results support Hypothesis 2. 
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Figure 5. Moderating Effect of Pro-Organizational Unethical Behavior on Anticipated Stock Performance (Study 2) 
 
Notes. Bands are 95% confidence intervals. The x-axis shows the entire range of the standardized variable of the 
extent to which the unethical act is judged as immoral (−5.02, 0.64); moderator set at ±1 standard deviation. 
Moderated Mediation Test 
The same moderated mediation analysis approach was used as in study 1. Perception that the unethical behavior 
was more pro-organizational had a significant indirect effect, mediated through moral judgments, but only when 
the organization’s goal was seen as more moral (first-stage moderation) and only at high (b = 0.07, SE = 0.02, CI 
[0.04, 0.11], B = 0.04) but not low (b = −0.01, SE = 0.02, CI [−0.04, 0.02], B = 0.00) levels of the unethical 
behavior being seen as pro-organizational (second-stage moderation). Perception that unethical behavior was 
more pro-organizational had no indirect effect when the organization’s goal was seen as less moral (first stage 
moderation), whether at high (b = 0.03, SE = 0.03, CI [0.00, 0.09], B = 0.02) or low (b = 0.00, SE = 0.01, CI 
[−0.02, 0.01], B = 0.00) levels of the unethical behavior being seen as pro-organizational (second-stage 
moderation). Thus, consistent with the results of study 1, pro-organizational compared with proself unethical 
behavior has a positive effect on estimated stock prices through moral judgments, but only when occurring within 
an organization with more-moral (but not less-moral) goals, and only at sufficiently high (but not low) levels of 
the unethical behavior being seen as pro-organizational. 
Study 2 Discussion 
Study 2 allowed us strengthen the internal validity of our conclusions and assess whether the public reacted in a 
way that conformed to our theory. In terms of importance of the effects observed, the main effects of pro-
organizational unethical behavior and the morality of the organization’s goals, and the interaction term for these 
constructs, accounted for 3% of variance in moral judgments (R2 = 0.03, p < 0.05). Though this effect was smaller 
than the effect found in the field (study 1), the second stage of our model accounted for 30% of variance in stock 
estimation (R2 = 0.30, p < 0.05). 
General Discussion 
News stories about organizational unethical acts appear frequently, and the resulting stock market responses can 
have a profound influence on the firms involved. Our model contributes to the ability to understand and predict 
such consequential outcomes of organizational unethical acts. Relying on work in moral psychology, we proposed 
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that the more moral the goal of the organization is perceived to be, observers judge pro-organizational unethical 
acts more leniently than proself unethical acts. Moral judgments of the unethical act in turn translate into negative 
stock performance for the firm primarily when the unethical act is pro-organizational, but less so when the act is 
proself. Two studies found evidence consistent with our model. Study 1 was an event study of stock market 
reactions to organizational unethical acts. Study 2 was an experiment in which we manipulated the features of 
unethical acts and the firm context and measured predictions of stock performance. 
Theoretical Implications 
Our paper advances prior work on stock market reactions to organizational unethical behavior. Considering 
nuances of both the unethical act and the firm context where the act occurs allowed us to move beyond extant 
models and generate new predictions. Most notably, even though the property of an unethical behavior being pro-
organizational, compared with proself, can attenuate moral judgments of the act, at least in the context of a firm 
that is perceived to have a more-moral goal, the same property can amplify negative economically relevant 
outcomes for the firm (reflected in stock performance) resulting from moral judgments of the act. This finding 
adds substantial precision in predicting stock market reactions to organizational unethical behavior. 
Our studies also suggest that a firm-level factor that can be considered constructive (i.e., being perceived as an 
organization with moral goals) can temper judgments of pro-organizational unethical acts. Prior CSR research has 
made similar arguments, noting that prosocial programs can create moral capital for a firm, which acts as 
“insurance-like” protection in the event of unethical organizational acts becoming known (Peloza 2006; Godfrey 
et al. 2009; Flammer 2013, 2015). We advance this work in two ways. First, we demonstrate the utility of a 
conceptually more general category that might drive the buffering effects—the perceived morality of the 
organization’s goals. Though this construct may emerge as a result of CSR programs, we show that the mere 
perception that a firm has moral goals (even absent CSR programs) can produce buffering effects. This is 
important because arguably all firms, irrespective of their CSR programs, vary in the extent to which their 
primary goals are perceived as moral. Thus, our theorizing broadens the scope of explanations linking moral 
capital generated by organizational activities with reactions to organizational unethical behavior. Second, we 
show that irrespective of the perception of organizational investment in morally commendable activities, 
organizations can suffer in terms of stock performance, determined by anticipated public reaction, if the act is 
seen as benefiting the firm. Thus, we demonstrate the importance of taking into account not just firm-level 
activities but also the individual actor who committed the unethical behavior (and specifically his or her intended 
beneficiary), revealing conditions whereby this “insurance-like” protection may have less of an added value. 
Third, our work has implications for research that looks at personal versus social motives for unethical behavior 
in organizations (Umphress et al. 2010, Thau et al. 2015). The psychological work in this area has focused 
primarily on the antecedents to these behaviors. It has been important in explaining when and why individuals 
engage in these behaviors and informing ways of eliminating these acts, but it says little about when and why pro-
organizational unethical acts do or do not translate into economically relevant outcomes for the firm. On the other 
hand, firm-level research in strategy, finance, and economics has looked at the outcomes of unethical acts but did 
not distinguish between pro-organizational and proself unethical acts (e.g., Baucus and Near 1991, Zitzewitz 
2012, Bennett et al. 2013). We contribute to the literature by integrating these two perspectives and showing that 
proself versus pro-other unethical behaviors elicit different responses and ultimately lead to different outcomes for 
the firm, depending on the features of the organizational context. 
Managerial Implications 
Our theory has implications for managers and policy makers. Employees have been shown to engage in pro-
organizational unethical acts because they want to help the firm (Umphress et al. 2010). However, our findings 
suggest that in certain cases such acts cause severe damage and should be especially discouraged—despite the 
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“good intentions” underlying the act. For example, in 2015, Wells Fargo was hit with a $185 million fine for 
employees engaging in illegal sales practices that included opening credit card accounts without customers' 
knowledge, acts that clearly benefited the bank. Managers might explain that it is these kinds of acts that have the 
potential to hurt the organization the most. By clearly communicating this fact, managers might undercut the 
motivation of employees to “help” the organization by crossing ethical boundaries. 
Second, our research has policy implications. Instances of the unethical behavior benefiting firms with moral 
goals might go unnoticed, because the first link in our model might be “broken” and such ethical violations will 
be less likely to be judged as immoral. Thus, within organizations pursuing a more moral goal, what may be 
considered “minor” unethical violations might go unnoticed. This may make managers more complacent when 
reacting to unethical acts in firms with moral goals. It may also make managers and the public less likely to be 
sensitive to degradation in the ethical conduct of firms with moral goals, in line with the “slippery slope effect,” 
showing that people are less likely to criticize the conduct of others when behaviors erode gradually as opposed to 
abruptly (e.g., Gino and Bazerman 2009). Thus, a greater scrutiny of organizations with moral goals may be 
warranted. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Reactions to unethical acts that occur within firms are a multidetermined phenomenon, and reactions are driven 
by multiple factors. Our theory focuses on one specific response (related to stock prices) of a general group (the 
public), and we also only focus on moral judgments as an explanatory mechanism. Concerns about the health of 
the firm or its ability to maintain adequate functioning may also impact other outcomes (e.g., buy-and-hold 
strategies, valuations, etc.). Although we did not focus on such considerations, or other outcomes, the process we 
describe should drive negative reactions irrespective of other factors. Across cultures, people make judgments of 
unethical acts and exhibit negative reactions even when it is costly (Henrich et al. 2006). We also believe that the 
pattern of effects proposed by our theory cannot be explained by confidence in firm functioning. For instance, in 
some cases (e.g., firms with moral goals), pro-organizational unethical behavior is judged less harshly. Yet it is 
not clear whether pro-organizational unethical behavior would lead to a greater confidence in the health of the 
firm than proself acts. Future research is needed to explore the interplay between moral judgments of 
organizational unethical acts and other relevant considerations, such as those about a firms’ ability to maintain 
adequate functioning, and also examine how our theory predicts other firm-relevant outcomes of unethical acts. 
Furthermore, we do not look at either the consequences for the individual(s) engaging in these unethical acts or 
the context of nonpublically traded firms (e.g., charities, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], etc.). However, 
our research does begin to highlight the importance of studying unethical acts in the context of organizations with 
highly moral goals. Because of the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia, these firms have become 
household names for unethical behavior. Less discussed are similar acts within humanitarian organizations such 
as Oxfam, AED, or Red Cross. Thus, an area for future research is the setting of more-moral organizations, such 
as NGOs and charities, which might unintentionally encourage unethical behavior. Future studies could explore 
whether pro-organizational unethical behavior is more likely to shift into proself unethical behavior within 
contexts of more-moral organizations. 
Conclusion 
This paper shows that how the public perceives the beneficiary of the act, and the morality of the organization’s 
goals, determines economic consequences of organizational unethical behaviors for the firm. Our theory embraces 
a fundamental, but often overlooked, reality of these acts: though they are committed by individuals, they also 
occur within a specific firm context. Using a multimethod approach, we show that even though pro-organizational 
unethical behaviors are judged less harshly in moral organizations, that same type of act results in the firm likely 
being viewed as an “accomplice” and thus hurts stock performance as a result. These findings are important for 
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understanding reactions to organizational unethical behavior and thus contribute to an integrated, contextualized 
understanding of consequences of unethical acts within organizations. 
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Endnotes 
1 In some situations an unethical act may be seen as helping the actor as well as the firm. Snyder (2010), for 
example, found that doctors were fraudulently using intensive care units to procure transplant livers, which was 
likely motivated by concern for the patient, although the physician and the hospital benefited by improving the 
number of successful transplants. However, it is likely that in most situations the actor and the organization are 
not seen as benefiting from unethical behavior to an equal extent, and our theory focuses on such situations in 
which there is one key perceived beneficiary of the unethical act. 
2 Our conceptualization of the morality of an organization’s goals resembles the notion of CSR (Godfrey et al. 
2009) but represents a more general construct in that even when firms are pursuing their direct economic goals, 
these goals can still vary in the extent to which they generate social utility (e.g., a medical company pursuing only 
its direct economic interests versus a tobacco company pursuing only its direct economic interests). 
3 We acknowledge that it is possible that even with the training provided, the coders may have been unqualified to 
assess the likelihood that an unethical act would trigger a fine or the magnitude of the act. 
4 We also conducted a between-subject experiment not reported here, which used standardized scenarios instead 
of real articles to address potential issues with idiosyncratic content; we found the same pattern of results. The full 
write-up of these findings and all data are available through the Open Science Framework link noted above. 
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